Covid-19 inquiry - the government response

See also my COVID page here UK Covid-19 Inquiry | Inquests & Inquiries

and my COVID podcast review of the inquiry here.

The UK Covid 19 Inquiry published its module 1 findings in July 2024

UK-Covid-19-Inquiry-Module-1-Full-Report.pdf

Download PDF • 1.99MB

About 6 months later (Jan 2025) the UK published its response to the recommendations.

UK_Government_Response_to_the_Covid-19_Inquiry_Module_1_Report.pdf

Download PDF • 294KB

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Pat McFadden made a statement to the commons (House of Commons - Covid-19 Inquiry Statement - BBC iPlayer), but there was barely any media coverage. Even the debate showed pretty minimal scrutiny. So, let me help you understand the good, bad and ugly about the government response to a damning set of findings.

Let's start with the good. It is really easy to criticise but there are lots of people who worked hard on this response. They deserve some recognition. Good things:

1. A response was promised in 6 months and it was delivered.

2. It happened alongside an updated National Risk Register (more on that later).

3. A review of resilience was initiated.

4. A vulnerability tool has been created.

5. Some guides have been created (Lessons and Exercising)

Pat's statement (pardon the informality, but his title is way too long to keep repeating) was alright for a politician. I'm not really sure it demonstrated understanding of the recommendations in depth. In fact it really didn't. That's ok though, he is a politician and this is deeply technical and there is a lot. He is speaking to other politicians... this isn't a lecture. I forgive the written report less, but we will come to that.

One last bit of good before we look at what could be better. Pat (unlike the written response) was clear about what the government accepted. When he said it was accepted he meant it and backed it up with the example. That is rare. So rare that it doesn't appear much in the written response where the word accept is used only twice by the government. Instead they agree 'but' far more often.

Before digging in to the report, Pat highlighted some key new actions. A committee which he chairs (good stuff...though I think everyone feels this should have been happening for a while), a 'new' Resilience academy, the resilience review, a national pandemic exercise and the vulnerability tool.

Committee = a good thing but the TORs would be helpful.

UK Resilience Academy = not really new. New branding but still seems to be provided by SERCO through a similar contract vehicle. The whole Emergency Planning community desperately want to see this work but we will really have to see. Its really not new either... the name has changed but the intent to create a National Security/Resilience/insert noun academy has been around for a decade easily and been a commitment in spending, security and defence reviews. For those who really like to ponder why no one gets punished for failure in government, the last iteration was supposed to draw together the Fire Service College, College of Policing, Defence Academy etc. Before Grenfell.... whose recommendations included the need for a national fire service college. Let that failure soak in a bit and understand why I am sceptical about well written government releases.

Resilience review = lets see.

National exercise = let's see. But not really new, and not quite what the recommendation asked for.

Vulnerability tool = I've not seen it, but it sounds potentially useful and a good example (perhaps) of central government actually doing something useful for the Local Resilience Forums.

Ok. Enough Mr Nice Guy. Lets dig in to the bad/ugly:

There are 10 recommendations and I think that they only really properly accept 3 of them. My measure for this is the EXCELLENT Sir Robert Francis KC. He is no stranger to running inquiries and I reproduce here a quote I would tattoo to the hands of every future inquiry chair and respondent:

"What is required is a means by which it is clear not only which of the recommendations has been accepted, by whom, and what progress is being made with implementation, but above all how the spirit behind the recommendations is being applied. All organisations that are or should be involved in implementation should account for their decisions and actions in this regard."

By this measure, I don't think the government do a perfect job (who does?) I have scored these from 0 (missed the point) to 10 (perfect).

1. A simplified structure for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience [8]

   
   

   The report gave 6 months to complete a review of structures (not complete?), 12 months for a ministerial committee (complete) and 24 months to rationalise and streamline all the other groups. Lets see. Slight subtraction for reusing the resilience committee to answer the X-gov committee (if this was sufficient why did the inquiry not find it so).

   
   

2. Cabinet Office leadership for whole-system civil emergencies in the UK [0]

   
   

   The response flatly disagrees with abolishing the lead government department. In so doing they don't address the underlying intent. The rest of the answer is terribly full of waffle and cut and paste from other documents on the Lead Government Dept model. Doesn't really accept the Cabinet office should show leadership not just monitoring and support.

   
   

3. A better approach to risk assessment [5]

   
   

   5 is a generous score based on the acceptance of the consideration of vulnerability in future assessments. The rest is a bit more cut and paste and no real acceptance of problems. Yes, it says, there should be multiple scenarios considered but that's not our fault we (the Cabinet Office) tell everyone they should be doing that.

It is even more annoying because they published the new NRR the same day, which still had single reasonable worst case scenarios, mathematical errors and the ridiculous combination of human and environmental disasters but on different time lines. My thoughts on this are captured in my comments to Dr Becky here ( Labour has updated the UK's National Risk Register – but is it fit for purpose?)

4. A UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy [6]

This is a classic swot student answer. Lots of detail but a bit chaotic. My money is on a clever fast streamer throwing it together. It doesn't actually answer the points and in one place says that HMG and the devolved administrations just don't agree.

Let that one simmer. The governments that failed, failed to collaborate properly or plan were told by the Inquiry they should accept a national approach. They chinned it off with a simple:

"However, all governments agree that a single UK-wide strategy which covers all of the recommendations would be unwieldy and would not be appropriate given devolution arrangements, responsibilities and accountabilities. We agree that risk planning should be done jointly or in concert, and we will cooperate closely as we develop the approach to a new resilience strategy."

Not. Really. Getting. The. Point.

5. Data and research for future pandemics [8]

   
   

   Messy answer, but not bad. Lots of work going on.

   
   

6. A regular UK-wide pandemic response exercise [7]

   
   

   A generous 7. There is supposed to be an exercising hub in the new UKRA (quite a lot getting put on them... be interesting to see what funding they are getting). They are running an exercise this year which claims to be big and involveing all levels of government and politicians.

   That will be great, but it isn't what was requested. The inquiry said run one every 3 years.

   
   

7. Publication of findings and lessons from civil emergency exercises [6]

   
   

   So this could be a good answer, but I'm a bit sceptical and we will have to see. A lot is thrown at the 'new' Resilience Academy. While they did publish guidance on lessons, I'm not so sure anyone was expecting them to come up with a lessons system (although its a good idea).

   
   

8. Published reports on whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience [5]

   
   

   Answer says they agree, but then doesn't commit to a report with all the content the inquiry wants to see. Instead offers an annual statement to parliament. Completely ignores the request for cost benefit analysis to be shared.

9. Regular use of red teams [4]

   
   

   I am being mean with the score because they list a lot of good stuff but some how miss their own (Cabinet Office) capability. But its all pretty messy. There is a lot of over confidence in how red teaming is already used. I would have liked to see them own this more and say it isn't about 'red teaming' per se but about using a range of techniques to create solid critical analysis. No real mention of the Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (literally in the Cabinet Office)

   
   

   Talks about the importance of the Home - Crisis Management Excellence Programme. having it in their syllabus. I then get a bit queasy that the solution seems to look a lot like more scientific panels. Some of my best friends are scientists but they simply aren't great at this.

   
   

10. A UK-wide independent statutory body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience [0]

    
    

    Simply not accepted (see above I guess, with arguments between governments).

CONCLUSION & AFTERTHOUGHTS

The response just isn't structured well and for something coming 6 months after the inquiry findings that is a bit poor. The Francis approach would have seen more structure in the answer, easier to understand responsibilities, timelines and deliverables against both the specific recommendations and intent. That is a shame because it looks like there is a lot of good work.

UK Resilience Academy. The UKRA is the paracetamol of the recommendations. They (like the Biosecurity Strategy and the UK HSA) get passed the majority of actions. Lacking from the response is what funding is going to support that, given that the historic format saw no money for SERCO and a pay back model by the agencies that send staff to the courses. While they have used a model of consultants historically, I think they would be wise to read the Grenfell inquiry carefully about providing an academy too rich in consultants and academics. The historic Fire Service College and EPC were good because of secondments of people that were current. There is a place for others, but there must be a balance.

Which leaves me with a final afterthought. The response mentions things like the EPC good practice documents. Exercising Best Practice Guidance (HTML) - GOV.UK is given as an example.

Once again, people have done a lot of work on this, but to my eye it shows an overworked and under resourced attempt to do stuff. The lessons guide is 'best' practice but the exercise guide is 'good' practice. The lessons guide doesn't even name the exercise guide correctly, calling it the best practice guide. An easy slip, but not great on a national document.

I feel I could, and probably will, do a full blog about it. I don't hugely fall out with it, but I just find it all a bit basic and quite repetitive of the previous (though uncited in the document) PP03-Exerercise-FEB-2016.pdf. It feels like a good introduction, but its missing more weight and a lot of it is pretty obvious. I would love to see it as a start to a suite of document more like the US FEMA approach Exercises | FEMA.gov.

What is missing? Well the other references are also a bit 'thin' (NRS_for_LRFs_V3.0__Aug2020.pdf and Exercise Objectives Template - JESIP Website) and its all still a bit localised and collaborative. The point of the inquiry is to drive standards and find gaps. That would seem to require more direction to LRFs and others to not just fulfil their statutory duty but what that fulfilment would look like. This speaks to the frustration of the inquiry about the Cabinet Office not taking more leadership and direction. This is also where the guide is a bit thin... exercises do all sorts of things (and it discusses them fairly well) but one of the most important is confirming that responses are ready to go against the planning assumptions. The military take this to the extreme, and may not be the perfect comparison, but exercises that don't reference back to a national vision of readiness is a waste of money. I suspect the reticence here is about money and the implications of direction, but how can you have an exercise prg with local decisions about what they test, but a national risk register with directed risks that must be considered? You can't 'half' lead... you either put the cake all the way in the oven or you get out the kitchen.