Hull floods

While the national Pitt Review looked at the UK as a whole, the Coulthard Report focused specifically on the "forgotten" disaster in Kingston upon Hull. On 25 June 2007, the city experienced nearly 100mm of rain in 24 hours—the highest intensity ever recorded in the region. Unlike other areas where rivers burst their banks, Hull’s disaster was almost entirely a "pluvial" event, meaning the water stayed on the surface because it had nowhere to go.

Professor Tom Coulthard’s team highlighted that 90% of Hull sits below the level of the high spring tide. The city relies on a sophisticated but aging system of pumps and "tides" to push water out into the Humber Estuary. The inquiry found that the drainage system, managed at the time by Yorkshire Water and the Environment Agency, was overwhelmed by the sheer volume of water. Crucially, it revealed that much of the flooding was caused by "bottlenecks" in the sewer network and the failure of several key pumping stations that were either not powerful enough or suffered electrical failures during the surge.

The report was notable for its criticism of the lack of communication. Because the River Hull had not burst its banks, the Environment Agency’s flood sirens—designed for "fluvial" or "tidal" flooding—did not go off. Thousands of residents went to bed unaware that their homes were slowly filling with surface water. The review also pointed out that the city’s schools were particularly vulnerable, with 90 out of 105 schools damaged, disrupting the education of 30,000 children.

The Hull Flood Review served as a vital local supplement to the Pitt Review. It argued that because of its geography, Hull required a bespoke "integrated" approach to water management. It paved the way for the Hull and Haltemprice Flood Strategy, which involved building massive new lagoons and "Aqua Greens"—parks designed to act as temporary reservoirs during heavy rain—fundamentally changing the landscape of the city to make it "flood resilient."