BP Amoco Thermal Decomposition Incident
The investigation found that three workers were killed when a polymer catch tank exploded because of internal gas pressure generated by decomposing plastic, which went undetected due to a blocked pressure gauge.
On 13 March 2001, a fatal incident occurred at the BP Amoco Polymers plant in Augusta, Georgia, which produced "Amodel," a high-performance nylon material. Following an aborted startup of the production line, a large volume of partially reacted polymer was sent to a 500-gallon waste vessel known as a polymer catch tank (KD-502A). Unbeknownst to the staff, the hot plastic inside the tank continued to react and decompose, a process that generated significant amounts of gas and caused the material to foam.
The CSB investigation identified a critical technical failure: as the foaming plastic rose, it entered the tank's vent lines and pressure gauge ports, where it solidified. This created a "plug" that completely isolated the pressure gauge from the internal environment of the tank. When a maintenance team arrived to clean out the vessel roughly 18 hours later, the pressure gauge read zero. Believing the tank was at atmospheric pressure and the contents were solid, the workers began to unbolt the 44-bolt flange cover.
When approximately half of the bolts were removed, the internal pressure—estimated to be significantly higher than the vessel's design limit—violently blew the cover off. The release expelled molten plastic at temperatures exceeding 260°C, killing three workers instantly. The force of the explosion also ruptured nearby Dowtherm (heat transfer fluid) lines, which ignited and caused a secondary fire that lasted several hours.
The inquiry's "Root Causes" focused on a lack of Reactive Hazard Recognition. BP Amoco had not conducted a formal hazard analysis of the catch tank during "abnormal" conditions, such as an aborted startup. Consequently, operating procedures did not account for the fact that Amodel could decompose and pressurise a vessel if left for extended periods. The report also noted that "near-miss" incidents—where drains had plugged or minor fires had occurred in the past—were not adequately investigated to identify the underlying danger of thermal decomposition.
Key numbers at a glance
11
Recommendations
14
Months to complete
Cost in millions (if known)
3
Deaths (direct)
Recommendations
Recommendation Category | Summary of Advice | Current Implementation Status |
Hazard Analysis | Perform a systematic hazard analysis for all "abnormal" and "startup" process phases. | Implemented (Adopted into the facility's Process Safety Management system). |
Pressure Monitoring | Install "flush-mounted" pressure sensors that are less prone to plugging by solidified polymer. | Implemented (Hardware upgrades completed on all catch tanks). |
Incident Learning | Revise the "Near-Miss" programme to ensure small fires and plugs are investigated for root causes. | Implemented (Updated internal reporting protocols). |
Industry Outreach | American Chemistry Council to share the findings with all plastics and polymer manufacturers. | Closed – Acceptable Action (Widespread industry bulletins issued). |
Safe Opening | Develop strict written procedures for "Safe Work" permits when opening potentially plugged vessels. | Implemented (Mandatory physical verification of zero pressure adopted). |
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