Bethlehem Steel Corporation Gas Condensate Fire

On the afternoon of 2 February 2001, a crew was performing maintenance on a 10-inch coke oven gas (COG) line at the Bethlehem Steel Burns Harbor Mill in Chesterton, Indiana. They were attempting to remove a slip blind and replace a cracked valve on a line leading to a furnace that had been decommissioned since 1992.

The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) identified the "Causal Factor" as the presence of a deadleg—a section of piping that remained in service but did not have active flow. Over nearly a decade, flammable COG condensate (a tar-like by-product containing benzene, toluene, and naphthalene) had accumulated in this vertical pipe section. Because it was a freezing winter day, workers were using a propane space heater directly below the work area to keep warm. When they loosened the flange bolts, the trapped liquid broke loose, sprayed the workers, and was immediately ignited by the heater.

The inquiry was highly critical of the plant's "Decommissioning and Demolition" protocols. The CSB found that when the furnace was shut down in 1992, management failed to identify that the vertical piping would act as a reservoir for hazardous liquids. Furthermore, because the area was undergoing demolition, several safety railings and stairways had been removed, leaving the workers on an elevated platform with restricted means of escape. The CSB also noted that many employees, and even the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), erroneously described the condensate as "mostly water," leading the crew to believe they were working on a low-risk line.