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Barton Solvents Flammable Liquid Explosion and Fire

The investigation found that a static electrical spark ignited flammable ethyl acetate vapours during the "splash filling" of a portable steel tank that was not effectively grounded, resulting in a fire that destroyed the facility’s packaging area.

On 29 October 2007, just three months after a massive explosion at their Valley Center site, a second fire occurred at the Barton Solvents distribution facility in Des Moines, Iowa. The incident occurred in the "Wholesale Building" while an operator was filling a 300-gallon portable steel tank (commonly known as a "tote") with ethyl acetate, a highly flammable solvent.


The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) identified the "Causal Factor" as a static spark discharge within the tote. Unlike the Valley Center incident, which involved a large fixed storage tank, the Des Moines accident occurred during a manual packaging operation. The operator was using a "splash filling" technique—where the liquid is dropped from the top of the tank through the air—which is a known high-risk manoeuvre for generating static electricity.


The investigation highlighted a critical failure in Bonding and Grounding. Although the operator had attached a grounding clamp to the tote, the CSB found that the electrical connection was ineffective, possibly due to a layer of paint or corrosion on the tote's surface. As the ethyl acetate (a static accumulator) was pumped in, the charge on the liquid surface built up until it jumped to a grounded metal part of the tank or the filling nozzle, igniting the vapour-air mixture in the headspace.


The fire spread rapidly to nearby containers of flammable liquids, causing several small explosions. The CSB was particularly concerned that this occurred so soon after the Kansas disaster, suggesting that the company had failed to implement urgent safety lessons regarding static electricity management across its other sites. This led to a broader industry warning about the dangers of using plastic-lined or improperly grounded metal containers for transferring non-conductive flammable solvents.

Key numbers at a glance

9

Recommendations

11

Months to complete

Cost in millions      (if known)

0

Deaths (direct)

Recommendations

Recommendation Category

Summary of Advice

Current Implementation Status

Filling Techniques

Prohibit "splash filling" and mandate "submerged filling" for all flammable liquids.

Implemented (Standardised in NFPA 30 and industry codes).

Bonding Verification

Mandate the use of "static ground monitoring" systems that verify a low-resistance path.

Implemented (Digital grounding interlocks now common in solvent plants).

Container Standards

Review the safety of using "Intermediate Bulk Containers" (IBCs) for static accumulators.

Implemented (DOT and NFPA regulations updated).

Employee Training

Enhance training on the "invisible" nature of static hazards during manual transfers.

Implemented (Integrated into the 2015 safety settlement audit).

Headspace Control

Use nitrogen inerting or "vapour balancing" for small-scale packaging operations.

Closed – Acceptable Action (Adopted as a recommended best practice).


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