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Barton Solvents Explosions and Fire

The investigation concluded that the transfer of a non-conductive flammable liquid into a storage tank created a massive static charge which ignited the vapour-air mixture in the tank's headspace, resulting in a fireball and projectile damage to the local community.

On the morning of 17 July 2007, an explosion and fire erupted at the Barton Solvents facility in Valley Center, Kansas (near Wichita). The facility was a distribution hub for a variety of industrial solvents. The incident began while a tanker-trailer was unloading Varnish Makers' and Painters' (VM&P) naphtha—a Class IB flammable liquid—into a 15,000-gallon above-ground storage tank.


The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) identified the "Causal Factor" as a static electrical discharge. VM&P naphtha is a "static accumulator," meaning it has low electrical conductivity and can hold a charge for a significant time. As the liquid was pumped into the tank, air was likely introduced into the piping, which, along with the "stop-start" nature of the filling, caused a rapid build-up of static electricity.


The ignition occurred inside the tank's "headspace." Unlike gasoline, which typically produces a vapour too rich to burn in a closed tank, the naphtha at ambient temperature created a "readily ignitable" fuel-air mixture. The spark was likely generated by the tank's internal liquid level gauging system. The float had a loose linkage that could separate slightly, creating a "gap" where the static charge could jump and create a spark. The resulting explosion launched the tank 130 feet into the air and ignited two more tanks. Projectiles, including tank tops and valves, were hurled into the surrounding community, striking a mobile home and a neighbouring business.


Just three months later, on 29 October 2007, a second, remarkably similar explosion occurred at a Barton Solvents facility in Des Moines, Iowa. That incident involved the filling of a 300-gallon portable steel tank with ethyl acetate, further reinforcing the CSB's findings regarding the systemic failure to manage static accumulation risks across the company.

Key numbers at a glance

9

Recommendations

11

Months to complete

Cost in millions      (if known)

0

Deaths (direct)

Recommendations

Recommendation Category

Summary of Advice

Current Implementation Status

Material Safety Data

MSDS/SDS must explicitly warn about static accumulation and headspace hazards.

Implemented (Adopted into GHS and industry SDS standards).

Equipment Design

Redesign or replace tank level floats to ensure constant electrical bonding.

Implemented (Standardised grounding linkages adopted).

Inerting

Evaluate the use of nitrogen blanketing (inerting) for tanks containing ignitable mixtures.

Closed – Acceptable Action (Incorporated into NFPA 77 guidance).

Operating Procedures

Limit filling speeds and ensure "slow-start" protocols for non-conductive liquids.

Implemented (Revised industry best practices for solvent transfer).

Regulatory Oversight

EPA and OSHA to increase inspections focusing on static electricity hazards.

Implemented (Resulted in the 2015 multi-site civil settlement).


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