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Aghorn Operating Waterflood Station Hydrogen Sulfide Release

The investigation found that a pump failure at an unventilated waterflood station released lethal levels of hydrogen sulphide ($H_2S$), killing a worker who responded to an alarm without a personal detector and his wife who entered the facility to find him.

On the evening of 26 October 2019, Jacob Dean, a pumper for Aghorn Operating, responded to an oil level alarm at the Foster D waterflood station in Odessa, Texas. Waterflood stations are used to pump "produced water" (a byproduct of oil extraction often containing high levels of toxic $H_2S$) back into reservoirs. Upon entering the pump house, Mr. Dean was overcome by $H_2S$ gas leaking from a pump with a failed plunger. When he failed to return home, his wife, Natalee Dean, drove to the station with their two children. Leaving the children in the car, she entered the pump house to locate her husband and was also fatally overcome by the toxic gas.


The CSB investigation identified several critical safety failures. Most significantly, the facility's fixed $H_2S$ detection and alarm system was non-functional; the control panel was not receiving signals from the sensors, meaning no audible or visual warning was triggered. Furthermore, Aghorn had failed to enforce the use of personal $H_2S$ monitors, and Mr. Dean was not wearing one at the time.


The report also highlighted "Confinement and Ventilation" issues. The pump house was a small, enclosed building where gas could quickly reach lethal concentrations. While it had vents and fans, it was unclear if they were operational. Finally, the CSB found a total "Lack of Safety Management." Aghorn had no written Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) procedures or formal $H_2S$ safety training programs in place at the time of the incident. In 2025, the case culminated in criminal convictions, with the company's Vice President sentenced to prison and the company pleading guilty to Clean Air Act violations.

Key numbers at a glance

9

Recommendations

19

Months to complete

Cost in millions      (if known)

2

Deaths (direct)

Recommendations

Recommendation Category

Summary of Advice

Current Implementation Status

Personal Detectors

Mandate and enforce the use of personal $H_2S$ detectors for all personnel.

Implemented (Aghorn now requires and tracks detector use).

Alarm Systems

Install multi-layered $H_2S$ alarms (audible/visual) that meet industry standards.

Closed – Acceptable Action (New automated systems installed).

LOTO Procedures

Develop and train staff on formal Lockout/Tagout procedures for all pumps.

Closed – Acceptable Action (Procedures created post-incident).

Site Ventilation

Commission an independent analysis of building ventilation and mitigation.

Closed – Acceptable Alternative (Physical alterations made to sheds).

Regulatory Action

OSHA to issue a safety alert regarding $H_2S$ and LOTO in the oilfield.

Implemented (Safety guidance issued to industry).


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