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Acetylene Service Company Gas Explosion

On January 25, 2005, a gas explosion killed three workers at the Acetylene Service Company plant in Perth Amboy, NJ. The blast originated in a wooden shed located near six large storage tanks that received liquid waste from the plant's acetylene generating system. The plant produces, repackages, and distributes acetylene used in welding.

On 25 January 2005, a powerful explosion destroyed a portion of the Acetylene Service Company (ASCO) plant in Perth Amboy, New Jersey. ASCO was a manufacturer and packager of acetylene gas, used primarily for welding. The blast originated in a small, unventilated wooden "lime shed" that housed pumps and piping for the facility's waste-water recycling system. Three workers were killed instantly or shortly after, and another was severely injured by a supersonic pressure wave (detonation) that hurled debris as far as 450 feet.


The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) and OSHA investigations revealed a "perfect storm" of mechanical failure and procedural negligence. Because it was a freezing winter morning, workers had left a drain valve open in the lime shed to prevent water lines from freezing. When the plant's acetylene generator was started, a critical "gumdrop" check valve—designed to prevent gas from flowing back into the water supply—failed because its stem became snagged, sticking the valve in the open position. With no water pressure in the line to counter it, high-pressure acetylene gas flowed backwards from the generator, through the open check valve, and out of the open drain valve directly into the lime shed.


The shed had no mechanical ventilation and contained a propane-powered space heater used to keep the pipes warm. The accumulated acetylene reached its explosive limit and was ignited, likely by the heater's hot surface or an electrical spark. The CSB noted that the company had no formal Process Safety Management (PSM) program and had a history of smaller fires that had gone unaddressed by rigorous safety audits. Furthermore, the check valve used was found to be an older design that was prone to exactly this type of "hang-up" failure.

Key numbers at a glance

5

Recommendations

12

Months to complete

Cost in millions      (if known)

3

Deaths (direct)

Recommendations

Recommendation Category

Summary of Advice

Current Implementation Status

System Isolation

Incorporate "double-block-and-bleed" valves on generator water lines to ensure gas cannot backflow.

Closed - No Longer Applicable (The facility was destroyed and the company ceased operations).

Safety Management

Implement a full Process Safety Management (PSM) program (OSHA 1910.119) including written checklists.

Closed - No Longer Applicable (Company out of business).

Regulatory Updates

OSHA to update the 1910.102 Acetylene Standard to remove obsolete references to 1960s-era pamphlets.

Implemented (OSHA updated standards to reference current NFPA 51A guidelines).

Equipment Safety

Manufacturer (Rexarc, Inc.) to notify all users that current check valves could fail to prevent backflow.

Implemented (Safety bulletins issued to industry users).

Facility Design

Ensure all sheds housing gas-connected equipment have adequate explosion-proof ventilation.

Superseded (Reflected in updated NFPA 51A industry standards).


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