Acetylene Service Company Gas Explosion
On January 25, 2005, a gas explosion killed three workers at the Acetylene Service Company plant in Perth Amboy, NJ. The blast originated in a wooden shed located near six large storage tanks that received liquid waste from the plant's acetylene generating system. The plant produces, repackages, and distributes acetylene used in welding.
On 25 January 2005, a powerful explosion destroyed a portion of the Acetylene Service Company (ASCO) plant in Perth Amboy, New Jersey. ASCO was a manufacturer and packager of acetylene gas, used primarily for welding. The blast originated in a small, unventilated wooden "lime shed" that housed pumps and piping for the facility's waste-water recycling system. Three workers were killed instantly or shortly after, and another was severely injured by a supersonic pressure wave (detonation) that hurled debris as far as 450 feet.
The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) and OSHA investigations revealed a "perfect storm" of mechanical failure and procedural negligence. Because it was a freezing winter morning, workers had left a drain valve open in the lime shed to prevent water lines from freezing. When the plant's acetylene generator was started, a critical "gumdrop" check valve—designed to prevent gas from flowing back into the water supply—failed because its stem became snagged, sticking the valve in the open position. With no water pressure in the line to counter it, high-pressure acetylene gas flowed backwards from the generator, through the open check valve, and out of the open drain valve directly into the lime shed.
The shed had no mechanical ventilation and contained a propane-powered space heater used to keep the pipes warm. The accumulated acetylene reached its explosive limit and was ignited, likely by the heater's hot surface or an electrical spark. The CSB noted that the company had no formal Process Safety Management (PSM) program and had a history of smaller fires that had gone unaddressed by rigorous safety audits. Furthermore, the check valve used was found to be an older design that was prone to exactly this type of "hang-up" failure.
Key numbers at a glance
5
Recommendations
12
Months to complete
Cost in millions (if known)
3
Deaths (direct)
Recommendations
Recommendation Category | Summary of Advice | Current Implementation Status |
System Isolation | Incorporate "double-block-and-bleed" valves on generator water lines to ensure gas cannot backflow. | Closed - No Longer Applicable (The facility was destroyed and the company ceased operations). |
Safety Management | Implement a full Process Safety Management (PSM) program (OSHA 1910.119) including written checklists. | Closed - No Longer Applicable (Company out of business). |
Regulatory Updates | OSHA to update the 1910.102 Acetylene Standard to remove obsolete references to 1960s-era pamphlets. | Implemented (OSHA updated standards to reference current NFPA 51A guidelines). |
Equipment Safety | Manufacturer (Rexarc, Inc.) to notify all users that current check valves could fail to prevent backflow. | Implemented (Safety bulletins issued to industry users). |
Facility Design | Ensure all sheds housing gas-connected equipment have adequate explosion-proof ventilation. | Superseded (Reflected in updated NFPA 51A industry standards). |
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Official Report: CSB Investigation Report - ASCO Gas Explosion (Direct PDF)
Fatality Report: NJ FACE Program: Three Workers Killed in Acetylene Plant Explosion
OSHA Citation: OSHA Inspection Detail: Acetylene Service Company
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