Accident involving Chinook ZA708 on 10 Aug 10

On the early morning of 10 August 2010, a Royal Air Force Chinook HC2A (serial number ZA708) was conducting a high-priority resupply mission in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The mission, operating out of Camp Bastion as part of Joint Helicopter Force (Afghanistan), involved delivering a 3.5-tonne under-slung load (USL) to Patrol Base (PB) Bahadur. The landing was attempted in challenging "low light" conditions as dawn was breaking, which contributed to high ambient dust recirculation—commonly known as a "brownout."

The Service Inquiry (SI) determined that as the aircraft approached the Helicopter Landing Site (HLS), it entered a large recirculating dust cloud. During the final moments of the load release, the aircraft drifted to the left. The No. 2 Crewman called for an "overshoot," but the port side of the Chinook impacted the compound wall of the Patrol Base. The aft rotor blades also collided with a "sangar" (fortified sentry post) within the compound. Although the pilot managed to regain control and conduct a successful emergency "running-landing" in a field 260 metres away, the impact on the wall had catastrophic consequences on the ground.

The force of the collision caused the roof of an attached building within the PB compound to collapse. Rifleman Remand Kulung, who was inside the building at the time, sustained very serious injuries. He was evacuated to the UK but tragically died of his injuries two days later. The airframe itself was so badly damaged that it was subsequently stripped of useful components and destroyed in situ to prevent it from falling into enemy hands.

The inquiry's findings were critical of the broader management of Helicopter Landing Sites in theatre. It revealed that PB Bahadur was essentially a "Lynx-sized" HLS being used for a much larger Chinook, and its dimensions had been unilaterally changed without being properly recorded. Furthermore, the husbandry of the site—specifically dust suppression—was deemed inadequate. The report concluded that while the crew were qualified and current, the lack of priority given to HLS management significantly increased the likelihood of such an accident. The findings led to a complete overhaul of how landing sites were categorised and maintained during the later years of Operation Herrick.